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THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL RESTRICTION ON THE
USE OF DRUG DETECTING CANINES
INTRODUCTION
T HE USE OF drug sniffing dogs to detect smuggled contraband began in
September 1970 as a means of interdicting the flow of illegal drugs
"through border ports and at major gateways" of this country.' Since then,
the use of dogs to detect contraband has been expanded to include such diverse
circumstances as schools,2 domestic airflights,3 and storage facilities.' The sensi-
tive noses of these dogs have been directed at individuals,5 luggage,' packages, 7
and vehicles.! This activity has raised constitutional issues implicating the fourth
amendment; the resolution of which has divided courts and commentators.
The purpose of this comment is to examine these issues, outline the con-
flicting positions, and attempt to forecast the direction the courts may take
in their effort to bring some harmony to this unsettled (and to some, unsettling)
area of law. Few people would attempt to deny law enforcement officials the
use of this highly effective and relatively unintrusive law enforcement tool. Yet
there are those who fear that the unsettled questions concerning limits on the
use of this tool may lead to serious abuse,9 and who raise the specter of unlimited
government intrusion should this type of investigatory activity fall through the
'Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down With A Case of
Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN. DIEGO L. REv. 410 (1976).
'Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, __ U.S. -,
103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'dper curiam, 631 F.2d
91 (7th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1012 (1981); Jones V. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
'United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981) aff'd, - U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); United
States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Sullivan,
625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976);
People v. Price, 54 N.Y. 2d 557, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 431 N.E.2d 267 (1981).
'United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
'Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd per curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. d enied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
'United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd __ U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); United
States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834 (1 1th Cir.
1982); United States v. West, No. 80-1727 (1st Cir. 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
'United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1983); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598
P.2d 421 (1979).
'United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976); People v. Matthews, 112 Cal. App.3d
11, 169 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1980).
'State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 822, 598 P.2d 421, 426 (1979).
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constitutional cracks and therefore be deemed exempt from judicial control. 0
I. BACKGROUND
Many of the major issues and areas of conflict in this area were intro-
duced and defined in cases that arose during the mid-1970's and early 1980's.
A brief overview of these cases will provide a background against which later
developments can be measured. The pressure on the police, and the resulting
pressure on the courts, to find effective means of combatting the apparently
uncontrolled upsurge in the distribution and use of drugs during this period
should be kept in mind while reviewing these cases and some of the highly
artificial doctrine that resulted.
In United States v. Fulero," decided in 1974, a Greyhound Bus Lines
employee reported the suspicious activity of "three hippies" who had brought
two footlockers to the Yuma terminal for shipment to Washington. The investi-
gating sergeant secured the services of "Chief," a drug-detecting dog, who had
been working regularly for two years and who was deemed to be "consistently
reliable." Chief alerted to the footlockers, and on the basis of this reaction
a warrant was obtained to open and search the lockers. Marijuana was found,
and a controlled delivery was made which resulted in the arrest and conviction
of the defendant. In affirming that conviction the district court stated:
The appellant contends that Chief's sniffing of the air around the
footlockers was an unconstitutional intrusion into the lockers. We think
the argument is frivolous. The appellant also contends that there was no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. We think there
was ample probable cause and that the conduct of the police was a model
of intelligent and responsible procedure."
By characterizing the sniff as focusing on the "air-space" around the
footlocker, the court removed the defendant's argument for a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the footlocker, which is necessary under Katz v. United
States3 to invoke the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Katz requirement became a favorite method of later
courts in finding that the sniff itself did not constitute a search.'
4
10 In the final analysis, whether a governmental intrusion in to a private area constitutes a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment depends on the kind and degree of intrusion which a free
society is willing to tolerate .... These [electronic monitoring devices, high power telescopes, and
the keen olfactory powers of specially trained dogs] and other extraordinary information gathering
devices gravely threaten each person's ability to maintain any semblance of privacy.
United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 328 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
'498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
'
21d. at 749.
'3389 U.S. 347 (1967).
"United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States
v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); People v. Mayberry, 117 Cal.
App. 3d 360, 172 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1981), superceded, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 644 P.2d 810
(1982); United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983).
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The Court in United States v. Solis' I5 found that the use of dogs to sniff
a semi-trailer constituted a search. Since this search was based upon a tip from
an informant of unknown reliability and the marijuana was seized pursuant
to a warrant issued after the dog sniff had detected the presence of drugs, the
evidence was suppressed as being the "fruit" of a prior illegal search.' 6 Since
the dogs, with a sense of smell eight times more powerful than that of man
and a claimed reliability of 100%0 were likened to the electronic bug in Katz, the
use of the dogs was held to be an illegal search in violation of the warrant
requirement. In focusing on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his trailer, the district court in it's Katz analysis found that
the intrusion was indeed a search.' 7
The above decision was overruled by the circuit court a year later 8 in an
opinion that built on Fulero and an intervening case, United States v.
Bronstein.9 In Bronstein, the court found that the defendant's diminished expec-
tation of privacy in his suitcase" removed the case from the parameters of Katz,
thus the use of dogs to sniff the luggage did not constitute a search. In a case
of judicial overkill, the court also spawned the subsequently much criticized2'
"plain smell doctrine." Under this doctrine, the use of a dog is analogized not
to the proscribed bug in Katz, but to such permissible sense-enhancing devices
11393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
"Id. at 326.
17Id. at 328.
'United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
'1521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975).
20 The canine surveillance conducted here occurred in a public airline terminal and the subject was
baggage shipped on a public air flight. There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy when
one transports baggage by plane, particularly today when the menace to public safety by the sky-
jacker and the passage of dangerous or hazardous freight compels continuing scrutiny of passengers
and their impedimenta.
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
21 I am unable to agree with the majority that use of a marijuana-sniffing dog to ascertain the contents
of a private bag amounts to some sort of "plain smell," comparable to a "plain view," rather
than a search ....
There is no legally significant difference between the use of an x-ray machine or magnetometer
to invade a closed area in order to detect the presence of a metal pistol or knife, which we have
held to be a search, United States v. Albarado, [cite omitted] and the use of a dog to sniff for
marijuana inside a private bag. Each is a non-human means of detecting the contents of a closed
area without physically entering into it . . . The fact that the canine's search is more particularized
and discriminate than that of the magnetometer is not a basis for a legal distinction. The important
factor is not the relative accuracy of the sensing device but the fact of the intrusion into a closed
area otherwise hidden from human view, which is the hallmark of any search.
Id. at 464.
"In practical effect there is no difference between the emanations of odor sniffed by the dog and
the sound vibrations sensed by such devices [magnetometer, spike mike]. Both originate from inside a
private area and travel beyond its perimeters." People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 565, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906,
910, 431 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1981).
Unlike the electronic "beeper" in Knotts, however, a dog does more than merely allow police to
do more efficiently what they could do using only their own senses. A dog adds new and previously
unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater
intrusion into the individual's privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive
as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices.
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2651 (1983).
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as flashlights and binoculars.22 The Bronstein court further distinguished the
use of a dog from that of a magnetometer or bug by noting that: 1) a dog
responds only to contraband and a mistake favors the suspect; 2) the limited
intrusion is directed not at the person, but at his baggage; 3) the dog is not
used in a dragnet fashion, but only in response to a reliable tip.23 On the basis
of the reduced expectations of privacy and the plain smell rationale the court
concluded, "The police have traditionally employed dogs to detect crime and
criminals and the limited but effective use of the animals here creates no con-
stitutional issue of substance." 24
In reversing the district court, the circuit court in United States v. Solis2
built on Fulero and Bronstein and found that the use of the dogs was not a
search but "rather monitoring of the air in an area open to the public...
[for the purpose of] determining the possible existence of a criminal enterprise
nearby." 26 Noting that there was no physical invasion, indiscriminate use of
sophisticated electronics, or search of the person, and that the "target" was
physical and not a protected communication, the court held "that the use of
the dogs was not unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore was not
a prohibited search under the fourth amendment." 27 This unconvincing reason-
ing would later be attacked by both commentators and courts.2"
In 1976, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Franklin County decided in State
v. Elkins' 9 that the use of a drug-sniffing dog to detect the presence of marijuana
in a crate mailed from San Diego to Cleveland constituted a search. The court en-
gaged in a Katz analysis and decided that, "by the use of a sophisticated device,
albeit flesh and blood, the user perceived something entirely hidden from human
senses, enhanced or unenhanced." 3 ° In engaging such a realistic Katz analysis
the Court did not deprive law enforcement officials of the fruits of their search.
The court found that such a search was reasonable under the circumstances,
since it was based on reasonable suspicion and conducted in a public place.3"
This rejection of the plain smell doctrine and the retention of authority to pass
on the reasonableness of the search is in accord with commentators who
"United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
""We fail to understand how the detection of the odiferous drug by the use of the sensitive and schooled
canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the police procedure constiutionally suspect."
Id. at 461.
14Id. at 463.
25536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
1Id. at 881.
"Id. at 883.
"Hansen, supra note 1 at 410. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
"47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
3"Id. at 311, 354 N.E.2d at 718.
""[T]he police, who fortunately have also developed more sophisticated techniques to deal with criminals
in response to a similar development on the part of criminals, utilized the trained police dog to obtain
the further evidence necessary for procurement of a search warrant." Id. at 312, 354 N.E.2d at 719.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:4
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ask the courts not to abdicate their responsibility in this matter. One commen-
tator wrote:
To hold that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed and that no
search occurred permits the judiciary, in effect, to wash its hands of its
normal supervisory role over a given type of governmental investigative
activity. Because of the nature of common law precedent, a single such
determination by an appellate court amounts to an authorization for the
police to continue that particular sort of investigative activity unfettered,
with little likelihood of being called to account under the fourth
amendment.32
In United States v. Race,33 the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that an agent conducting a random canine search of an airline cargo ware-
house could use the alert of the dog as the foundation for the probable cause
needed to arrest the defendant.3" In this sharp break with previous cases, the
court ignored the reasonble suspicion requirement that was implicit in Fulero, I
Solis, 6 and Bronstein,II in which informers' tips served as the catalyst for police
activity and as a foundation of those courts' Katz analyses. The Race court
declined to address the basic issue of whether or not the sniff constituted a
search and concentrated its analysis on the reliability of the dog as established
by the government's evidentiary foundation.3 s As the number of cases dealing
with the dog-sniff issue increased without providing clear resolution or guidance,
later courts juggled the factors of reasonable, articulable suspicion, 9 probable
cause based on the on the dog alert,'" and the credibility and reliability of the
dog" in an ever less credible attempt to justify the position that the use of a
drug-sniffing dog did not constitute an intrusion of any kind and was thus
exempt from fourth amendment control.
"Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11
GA. L. REv. 75, 86 (1976).
"1529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 14. Contra People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
"498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
3563 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
"521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975) cert denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
38 The dog's strong alert to the two crates, when turned loose in a warehouse containing some 300
crates, was enough to give agent Murphy, who had worked with the dog since 1971, reason to believe
the crates held contraband. We do not, of course, suggest that any dog's excited behavior could,
by itself, be adequate proof that a controlled substance was present, but here the Government laid
a strong foundation of canine reliability and handler expertise.
United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1976).
"United States v. McCranie, 703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1983); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th
Cir. 1981); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
"United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied - U.S. __ , 103 S. Ct. 3543
(1983); United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1982).
"Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980); People v. Matthews, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 11, 169 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1980); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Patino,
649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983).
Spring, 19841 COMMENTS
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In People v. Williams," a California court of appeals suppressed evidence
discovered during a random sniff of an airline baggage area by a dog of ques-
tionable reliability. While the illegal conduct of the officers was a factor in
its decision, the court focused on the lack of any reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion as the major reason for affirming the grant of the suppression order:
Without a search warrant and without notice or knowledge of the possi-
ble presence of any narcotics, Perkins and Nash took Bourbon to the
baggage staging area of American Airlines, not open to the public, in the
back of the terminal, in order that Bourbon might engage in a fishing
expedition, or more precisely in this instance in a sniffing expedition, of
a general, routine, exploratory nature, for marijuana, cocaine and heroin.
They were not looking for weapons or bombs . . . it only included
marijuana, cocaine and heroin. 3
The Williams court stopped short of calling the poice activity a search.
However, it is evidence from its concern with the reliability of the dog and
the need for articulable, reasonable suspicion that the court was uncomfor-
table with the ever-expanding ramifications of earlier pronouncements that the
use of drug-sniffing dogs did not constitute a search.
The court in Washington v. Wolohan" focused on the reliability of the
dog and held that the alert of the dog alone provided sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant in a "random sniff" case. "5 Although it
tossed in garbled and unconvincing arguments concerning reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy 6 (based in reality on the plain smell fiction), the court failed
to find that such a use of a dog constituted a general, exploratory search;
therefore, no reasonable suspicion was necessary for the police to engage in
such activity.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Mclnturff departed from the traditional
all-or-nothing Katz analysis and viewed the dog-sniff issue in light of the analysis
used in the case of Terry v. Ohio."7 Under Terry and its progeny, an "inves-
tigatory stop" is warranted without probable cause if there is a specific
articulable fact to support a suspicion that contraband is present. A balance
of interests between the individual's expectation of privacy and the state's interest
"People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
"1d. at 348-49, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
"23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
"Id. at 815, 598 P.2d at 423.
46 The outside of the package is open to view and the package is subject to dropping or tearing. We
hold that although Wolohan may have had a limited expectation of privacy as to the contents and
his personal effects in a package in transit, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the area in which the package itself was located, the parcel area, nor in the air space immediately
surrounding the package from which the odor emanated.
Id. at 818, 598 P.2d at 424.
4'392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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in effective enforcement renders such a stop reasonable.4 '8 The factors to be
considered in achieving this balance include the nature and severity of the in-
trusion and the type and importance of the government interest that is to be
furthered. Judge Mclnturff found that the wholesale, random use of the dog-
sniff would militate against the use of the dog in this situation, and the balance
to be in favor of the individual's expectaion of privacy stating:
The prospect of canine sniffers lying in wait at every corner, con-
ducting what under these facts must be termed an exploratory search,
offends my sensibilities and the principles underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment ....
While there is disagreement over whether sniffing by the uninvited
canine nose constitutes a search, the cases are virtually unanimous in re-
quiring or finding that the police officer entertained a reasonable suspi-
cion regarding the presence of contraband in the particular area to be
searched prior to employing the canine's drug-sensitive senses ....
While a person's expectation of privacy legitimately diminishes when
packages or baggage are consigned to a common carrier, I cannot agree
that all Fourth Amendment protections are forfeited, thus authorizing
wholesale examinations in the hope that a crime might be detected. 9
As it became apparent to courts5" and commentators5' that the resolution
of the dog-sniff issue under Katz alone led to highly artificial and strained
analysis, more attention was given to the investigatory stop allowed under the
Terry analysis with the presence of specific, articulable facts upon which an
officer could base a reasonable suspicion. Even before the Terry progeny52 ex-
panded the Terry investigative stop beyond the limited weapons pat-down area,
one commentator stated:
It is submitted.., that a methodology analogous to that of Terry is better
suited than Katz to deal with the type of intrusions seen in Bronstein,
Fulero, and Solis. A Terry-type methodology would recongize that the
government engages in activity subject to the fourth amendment's pro-
scriptions when it utilizes dogs to detect contraband, but that this usage
does not necessarily constitute a full search. The reasonableness of such
"Id. at 24.
"State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 822-23, 598 P.2d 421, 426-27 (1979).
'"United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981) aff'd, - U.S. _ , 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); United
States v. Freymuller, 571 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. 111. 1983).
s1 As a result of the inherent vagueness of the Katz doctrine, three views have emerged to deal
with the canine situation: first, that no search occurred; second, that a search occurred but it was
reasonable under the circumstances; and third, that a search occurred and it was unreasonable absent
a search warrant or exigent circumstances. [Footnotes omitted.]
Schuster, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM
L. REV. 973, 989 (1976).
"Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), reh. denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980);
Florida v. Royer, - U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
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a subsearch would be gauged by a balancing process in which the primary
considerations would be the individual's expectations of privacy on the
one hand and both the degree of the intrusion and the circumstances oc-
casioning that intrusion on the other."
As America entered the 1980's with the dog-sniff issue unresolved and
the flow and distribution of illicit drugs continuing unabated, federal and state
courts continued to rely on the discredited plain smell doctrine 4 to justify their
position that the use of drug-sniffing dogs did not constitute a search under
the fourth amendment.
II. THE SCHOOL CASES
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, a series of cases involving random,
dragnet type sniff-searches of students while on school premises served to throw
the dog-sniff issue into sharp relief. The same issues of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, the reliability of the dogs and even plain smell were transferred
to the school setting. While nobody would deny that school officials had a
legitimate, even compelling interest in stemming the tide of possession and use
of drugs in schools, the degree of intrusiveness represented by a sniff search
of the body forced some courts to the realization that such activity did con-
stitute a search.55
In Doe v. Renfrow, 5 6 officials conducted an investigation employing the
aid of drug-sniffing dogs in response to concern over the perceived high level
of drug use. The dogs were allowed to sniff the students; those students to
whom the dogs alerted during the sniff were escorted to a nurse's office and
subjected to a nude body search." Using a combination of the plain smell
doctrine,58 in loco parentis,59 and the lesser standard of "resonable cause to
believe,' 60 as the basis for using the canines to detect narcotics, the district
"Peebles, supra note 32, at 95.
"United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States
v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Lewis, 708
F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983).
" The dog's inspection was virtually equivalent to a physical entry into the students' pockets and
personal possessions. In effect, he perceived what the students had secreted and communicated
that information to his handler ....
Like an X-ray machine, his superhuman sense of smell invaded the students' outer garments
and detected the presence of items they were expecting to keep private.
Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 233 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
"1475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd per curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1022 (1981).
"Id. at 1024.
"Id. at 1020, 1026.
"Id. at 1023.
60 This Court now finds that in a public school setting, school officials clothed with the responsibilities
of caring for the health and welfare of the entire student population, may rely on such general
information to justify the use of the canines to detect narcotics .... This lesser standard applies
only when the purpose of the dog's use is to fulfill the school's duty to provide a safe, ordered
and healthy educational environment.
Id. at 1021.
[Vol. 17:4
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court found: 1) that the use of the dogs to sniff the students did not constitute
a search; 2) that the subsequent search of the students' pockets was reasonable
and therefore did not violate the fourth amendment; and 3) that the nude body
search was unreasonable and therefore violated the fourth amendment.6"
Evidently, the doctrine of in loco parentis, which modifies the constitutional
rights of the students and allows for the search of pockets based on a dog sniff,
will not allow for a nude search based on the same information.
Ironically, the plaintiff in Doe v. Renfrow was not found to be in posses-
sion of any contraband. She had been playing with one of her own dogs that
morning and that dog had been in heat."2 The Doe court blithely ignored the
issue of the reliability of the dog, which in earlier cases had been such a major
factor in finding that the alert of such dogs could provide probable cause. 3
The court also chose to ignore the fact that although the dog alerted fifty times,
only seventeen students were found to be in possession of contraband."4 The
case was remanded by the Seventh Circuit"5 on the question of damages when
the circuit court reversed the district court's finding that the defendant had
limited immunity from such charges.
In his dissent from the order denying certiorari, Justice Brennan vigoriously
disagreed with the reasoning of the district court. He thought that the use of
the dogs to sniff persons constituted a search. He also rejected the plain smell
rationale," stating that actions taken under the in loco parentis doctrine must
be consistent with the fourth amendment. 7 The depth of Justice Brennan's
concern about the issue is evident from his concluding statement:
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police
and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that
day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher
had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another
lesson: that the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people
61 The continued alert by the trained canine alone is insufficient to justify such a search because the
animal reacts only to the scent or odor of the marijuana plant, not the substance itself .... Therefore,
the alert of the dog alone does not provide the necessary reasonable cause to believe the student
actually possesses the drug.
Id. at 1024.
21d. at 1017.
6'See, e.g., United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Solis,
536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976); People v. Matthews,
112 Cal. App. 3d 11, 169 Cal Rptr. 263 (1980).
"Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1024 (1981).
"'631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
66 I cannot agree that the Highland School officials' use of the trained police dogs did not constitute
a search. The dogs were led from student to student for the express purpose of sniffing their clothing
and their bodies to obtain information that the school authorities and police officers, with their
less developed sense of smell, were incapable of obtaining.
Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1025 (cert. denied) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6"'While school officials acting in locoparentis may take reasonable steps to maintain a safe and healthful
educational environment, their actions must nonetheless be consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 1022.
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to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures," and that before police and local of-
ficers are permitted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public
school students, they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particulariz-
ed evidence to establish probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed.
61
In Jones v. Latexo Independent School District,"9 the district court decided
that the use of drug-sniffing dogs to detect contraband in the possession of
students constituted a search.7" This determination was followed by an analysis
of whether or not a dragnet search was reasonable in the absence of indivi-
dualized suspicion. Engaging in a Terry-type balancing analysis, the court con-
sidered the scope, manner and justification of the intrusion. Noting that the
scope of the intrusion was somewhat less than that of a physical search; that
the dog would signal only if contraband was detected; and that the school
officials had warned students that such sweeps would be conducted, the court
found that other factors militated against the reasonableness of such searches
in the absence of the individualized suspicion required for a Terry stop. I The
other factors were: 1) the fact that large German Sheperds, which had also
been trained as attack dogs, actually touched, and in some cases slobbered on
the children, causing intimidation and fright; and 2) "the mere announcement
by officials that individual rights are about to be infringed upon cannot justify
the subsequent infringement .... Thus, the reasonable expectation of students
to be free from such an intrusion survived all warnings by school officials that
such searches were to take place."" In deciding that the sweep search of the
students by the dogs was unreasonable under these circumstances, the court
focused on the need for articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion,
stating:
Just as the police could not lawfully bring Merko into a restaurant, foot-
ball stadium, or shopping center to sniff-search citizens indiscriminately
for hidden drugs, the school officials exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness in using Merko to inspect virtually the entire Latexo student
body without any facts to raise a reasonable suspicion regarding specific
individuals."
6'Id. at 1027.
69499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
""Students, like all other 'persons' under our Constitution, have fundamental rights which must be respected
by state authorities." Id. at 231. "All citizens have a reasonable expectation that their privacy will not
be intruded upon by electronic surveillance, X-ray machines, or sniffing dogs at the whim of the state."
Id. at 233.
"Id. at 233, 234.
"Id. at 234.
"Id. at 235. The court also specifically rejected the "plain smell" argument relied on by the Doe v. Renfrow
Court, stating, "The court's approval of a blanket high school sniff-search in that case stemmed from
an erroneous view that the dog merely augmented or enhanced school officials in their own inspection
of the school." Id. at 236.
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In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District,74 the court decided,
on the basis of Jones, that a school district could not subject students to ex-
ploratory sniff-searches in an effort to detect contraband.75 In rejecting the
Doe7 court's rationale, the Horton court focused on the nature of the intru-
sion as measured against the interest in the integrity of one's body, stating
"society recognizes the interest in the integrity of one's person, and the fourth
amendment applies with its fullest vigor against any intrusion on the human
body."" In rejecting any use of the plain smell doctrine to justify the sniff
in such cases, the court stated that "most persons in our society deliberately
attempt not to expose the odors emanating from their bodies to public smell." 78
The offensiveness and intimidation involved in the close quarter sniffing by
a large animal was held to render such a search unreasonble.19
The Horton court found that the blanket sniff of lockers and cars did
not constitute a search under the fourth amendment. As a result the court
remanded to the district court for a determination regarding the reliability of
the dogs as a basis for the requisite reasonable suspicion needed to justify the
further search of the lockers.8 0
III. AIRPORT LUGGAGE CASES
The airport sniff-searches of luggage in the early 1980's usually involved
the use of dogs to sniff unattended luggage in an effort to detect contraband.
Most courts continued to hold that this activity did not constitute a search,
but implicitly required that there be some sort of reasonable suspicion to pro-
vide a basis for the dog-sniff.8 ' This suspicion was provided in many cases when
an individual exhibited behavioral characteristics consistent with the so-called
"690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
"See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
"see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"690 F.2d 470,.478 (5th Cir. 1982).
"Id.
7"Intentional close proximity sniffing of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or human."
Id. at 479. One commentator has stated:
Being smelled by another is more demeaning than being seen or heard by another because one's
smells are tied closely to those bodily functions considered to be particularly intimate. Hence, having
one's person sniffed by a police dog in order to discover evidence constitutes a violation of the
right to be free from indecent intrusions and therefore constitutes an unreasonable search under
the fourth amendment. [footnotes omitted.)
Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom - Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L.
REV. 803, 851 (1980).
'°"Although the use of the dogs in dragnet sniffing of lockers and cars is permissible, we must remand
to the district court for the case to proceed to trial on the reliability of the dogs' reactions as the basis
for further searches." Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 488 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, - U.S. .. 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
"E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United
States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1"981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Klein,
626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1982); People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 431 N.E.2d
267 (1981); But see, People v. Mayberry, 117 Cal. App. 3d 360, 172 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1981); superceded,
31 Cal. 3d 335, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 644 P.2d 810 (1982).
Spring, 19841 COMMENTS
11
Pomeroy: The Need For Judicial Restriction on the Use Of Drug Detecting Canines
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
"drug courier profile.""2 This courier profile was an informal compilation of
characteristics which drug enforcement personnel perceived as being common
to many of those engaged in drug smuggling activities. The seven primary
characteristics were articulated as: 1) travel to or from a known "source city";
2) little or no luggage or a large quantity of empty luggage; 3) an unusual
itinerary with a rapid turn around; 4) the use of an alias in booking a flight
or on baggage tickets; 5) carrying large amounts of cash, sometimes in the many
thousands of dollars; 6) the purchase of a ticket with large amounts of small
denomination currency; and 7) "unusual" nervousness.8 3 The use of this profile
as a means of supplying the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a Terry-
type investigative stop of the individual generated a substantial amount of
litigation.84 Its use as a means of directing the dog to luggage that seemed likely
to conceal contraband was not seriously challenged.
In United States v. Beale," the Ninth Circuit addressed the propriety of
subjecting a traveler's luggage to a dog sniff in the absence of a reasonable
suspicion. The Court held "that the use of trained canines in this case was
improper absent a showing of 'founded suspicion.' "86 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court reconsidered the earlier dog-sniff cases and found that a
polarization of analyses concerning the dog-sniff issue had led to a troubling
inflexibility in this area which seemed to allow for the wholesale intrusion upon
traveler's fourth amendment rights.7
In beginning its analysis, the Beale court reconsidered the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy analysis of Bronstein and Fulero and determined that holdings
which would deny this reasonable expectation of privacy in personal luggage
are of doubtful validity. 8 The court found that" [i] f the potentially 'hazardous'
"E.g., United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United
States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1982); People
v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 431 N.E.2d 267 (1981).
"United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1982).
"United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), reh. denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980); Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
"674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
161d. 1328.
$7 Unfortunately, the parties have treated the "dog sniffing" issue in absolute terms. Beale argues,
for instance, that the primary issue is whether the use of "Nick" to sniff his suitcase was a search
requiring probable cause. The District Court, in the suppression hearing, held that the use of trained
canines in this case was not a search and, hence, that no showing of suspicion was required ....
Not only do these arguements oversimplify our holding in United States v. Solis. . . they also
misapprehend the importance of a person's privacy interest in personal luggage.
Id. at 1330.
so We seriously doubt whether the reasoning employed in Bronstein and Fulero is still sound. In
Bronstein the Second Circuit stated that "[t]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy when
one transports baggage by plane, particularly today when the menace to public safety by the skyjacker
and the passage of dangerous or hazardous freight compels continuing scrutiny of passengers and
their impedimenta." . . . By applying Chadwick to transcend and limit the "automobile exception"
to the warrant requirement in Arkansas v. Sanders... the Supreme Court seems to have rejected
the Bronstein reasoning.
Id. at 1330-31. In United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981) the court stated, "[i]t should
be noted that searches in the interest of drug enforcement cannot be justified on the same basis as those
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or 'dangerous' nature of a cargo is sufficient to abrogate traveler's reasonable
expectation of privacy in containers being transported, the Bronstein approach
would justify unrestricted roadblocks and vehicular searches, dragnet monitoring
of domestic mail, and other unacceptable results." 8 9
Having established that an individual does indeed have an expectation of
privacy in his luggage greater than that articulated in Bronstein,9" the court
avoided labeling the activity as a "search" and focused its inquiry on whether
such activity was "an invasion of the owner's 'inevitable' and 'inherent' privacy
interest in the contents therein." 9' The first step in this inquiry was a square
rejection of the plain smell doctrine. Citing Judge Mansfield's concurring
opinion in Bronstein,9 2 the court stated:
[T]he dog does not amplify its handler's perception; it is an independent
detection device, alerting the officer to information he would have been
utterly unable to detect with his own senses. Nick's nose did not enhance
Detective Berk's senses; it replaced them ....
The molecules of contraband emanating from the interior of luggage
are so subtle and incapable of human perception that a canine's detec-
tion of them constitutes an intrusion into the owner's privacy interest,
in the contents of the container.93
The court next addressed the argument that since the dog would only detect
the presence of contraband, the nature of such intrusion, if indeed it was an
intrusion at all, was so minimal so as to remove it from the realm of fourth
amendment protection. The court rejected this argument, stating that "[t]he
fact that trained canines may detect only contraband diminishes, but does not
obliterate, the nature of the intrusion." 9' While this "lesser intrusion" did not
in the airport security context; instead drug searches are to be analyzed under traditional Fourth Amendment
principles." Id. at 361 n.6. Although the Goldstein court held that a dog-sniff did not constitute a search,
it relied on the artificial and much criticized plain smell doctrine, stating. "[tihe passenger's reasonable
expectation of privacy does not extend to the airspace surrounding that luggage." Id. at 361.
"United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1982). The court also stated, "The Supreme Court
has recognized that 'luggage' is a common repository for one's personal effects, and therefore is inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Id. at 1331 n.5.
"See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
"United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
"See supra note 21.
"United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1982). Chief Justice Bird expressed acord with
this view in her dissenting opinion in People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 349, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 625,
644 P.2d 810, 818 (1982). In that opinion she states:
The officers in this case were relying wholly on the perceptions of Corky and not on their own
faculties. Consequently, the luggage's contents were not "exposed to the public," unless we are
to interpret "the public" as meaning specially trained dogs. Nor can it be said that appellant
"knowingly" exposed the contraband to the public, since he, not being a specially trained dog himself,
would not have known that any aroma was escaping from his luggage.
Id. at 818. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
"United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982); See also supra note 21.
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require a warrant" for its exercise, the court wondered under what circumstances
a positive alert by such a dog would provide probable cause and/or support
the issuance of a warrant. While the reliability of such dogs had on occasion
been expressly challenged,96 false alerts by the dogs were apparent in some of
the cases." There are also cases in which the absence of a "full alert" forces
the dog handler and the investigating agent to make an on-the-spot determination
whether or not to continue the investigation on less than a clear indication that
there is contraband present.98 Keenly aware of the danger associated with the
possibility of false alerts, the court stated:
Our decision is expressly premised on this concept of canine reliability
and on the fact that the Government must establish the dog's reliability
as part of its showing to support the issurance of a warrant or a finding
of probable cause ....
It must be emphasized that dogs, like humans and machines, are not
infallible, and that, not withstanding the optimistic views of some com-
mentators, on occasion a narcotics dog may err. Thus, the mere fact that
a dog alerts to a suitcase, even when there is founded suspicion to allow
the dog to sniff, is not necessarily ground for probable cause to open and
inspect it. Knowledge that the dog is reliable is central to establishing the
necessary probable cause. 99
In many of the luggage-sniff cases a troubling issue was that of the accep-
table length of time between receipt of the drug courier profile or some other
95 Therefore, we hold - consistent with the unarticulated reasoning of United States v. Sois; United
States v. Klein; United States v. Bronstein; and United States v. Fulero - that the use of a canine's
keen sense of smell to detect the presence of contraband within personal luggage is a Fourth
Amendment intrusion, albeit a limited one that may be conducted without a warrant and which
may be based on an officer's 'founded' or 'articulable' suspicion rather than probable cause.
Id. at 1335. For the "articulable suspicion" requirement of Terry v. Ohio see supra notes 47, 48 and
accompanying text.
"United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1982). Cf. People v. Price, 54 N.Y. 557, 564, 446 N.Y.S.2d
906, 909, 431 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1981), where the court responds to defendant's contention that he should
have been allowed to examine the dog which sniffed his luggage with the statement:
There is no validity to defendant's argument where he has failed to present any evidence to
rebut the People's documentary proof of the dog's ability to detect in every instance the presence
of controlled substances. Had he come forward with any indication of questionable reliability, it
would have been within the trial court's discretion to grant the requested discovery.
"In Doe v. Renfrow, the dog "alerted" to the plaintiff not because the plaintiff possessed any contraband,
but because earlier that day plaintiff had been playing with a dog which was in heat. In the same case
it was noted by Justice Brennan, in his dissent from the order denying certiorari, that although the dogs
had alerted fifty times, only seventeen of the students were found to be in possession of contraband. In
Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., it was indicated that the dog "Merko" would alert upon detection
of the odor of lighter fluid.
"See, e.g., United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d
232 (1st Cir. 1982). In Jodoin, the court noted, "Although a drug detecting dog did not react when it
sniffed the suitcase, the agents pointed out that, according to dog handlers, 'the dogs are not foolproof,'
they 'are less accurate on hot muggy days .... .' " Id. at 236.
"United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982). Accord, Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp.
1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'dper curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981);
Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 680 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, __ U.S.___
103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983); United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Waltzer,
682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983); People v. Matthews. 112 Cal. App.
3d 11, 169 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1980). See also supra note 38.
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source of information giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that luggage held
contraband, and the time when the luggage must be subjected to a sniff inves-
tigation which could yield the requisite probable cause needed for a warrant
to open it. 100 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in United States v. Place,10'
in which it affirmed the Second Circuit's holding' 2 that the detention of luggage
for almost two hours was beyond the limits of a Terry-type investigative stop
and therefore violated the fourth amendment.'10 The Second Circuit applied
a Terry-type analysis to the facts and found that a brief detention and exposure
of the baggage to a drug-sniffing dog would not, of itself, violate the fourth
amendment. 10'
The Supreme Court justified the use of the Terry-type investigative stop
in this situation on the "inherently transient nature of drug courier activity
at airports" and the fact that such activity "substantially enhances the likelihood
that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution
channels."' 5 While the court was viewing the dog-sniff issue in conjunction
with the Terry-type investigative stop and brief detention of luggage, it articu-
lated the reasonable suspicion requirement in a fashion that indicates that it
is needed not only to justify the stop and the detention, but also the intrusion
itself.'1 The Court declined, however, to characterize the dog-sniff as a search:
We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in contents
of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A "canine
sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not re-
quire opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that
"'United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (twenty minute period of detention between
initial stop and sniff search is reasonable under Terry); United States v. Regan, 687 F.2d 531 (lst Cir.
1982) (twenty-two hour detention of luggage based only on a reasonable suspicion is unreasonable under
Terry and therefore violates the fourth amendment); United States v. Moya, 704 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1983)
(three hour detention is reasonable under Terry); State v. Dupay, 62 Or. App. 798, 662 P.2d 736 (1983)
(one hour and twenty minute detention on only reasonable suspicion is too long and violates the fourth
amendment).
101103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
"'United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981).
*"[E]ven assuming that circumstances justifying an investigatory stop existed, the prolonged seizure of
Place's baggage went far beyond a mere investigative stop and amounted to a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights." Id. at 50.
104 In the present case, if the agents had, on the basis of a reasonable suspicion but without probable
cause, merely exposed Place's baggage to a trained sniffer as he was passing through LaGuardia,
this brief detention might, assuming reasonable grounds for suspicion, fall within the limits of Terry
and its progeny .... Here, howver, the "investigative" seizure lasted for almost two hours (from
slightly before 4:00 p.m. until 5:45 p.m. when the sniffer established probable cause) ....
In our view this protracted dispossession cannot reasonably be characterized as a Terry-type
"investigative stop."
Id. at 51-52.
"'United States v. Place, - U.S. .. 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1983).
106 Given the fact that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal
effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing
governmental interests will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property
contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
Id. at 2644.
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otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example,
an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the
manner in which information is obtained through this investigative techni-
que is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff
discloses only 'the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.
Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about
the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This
limited disclosre also ensures that the owner of the property is not sub-
jected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which
the information is obtained and in the content of the information reveal-
ed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course
of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here - exposure of
respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained
canine - did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.' 07
It is significant that the Court did not rely on the discredited' 8 plain smell
doctrine in reaching its conclusion.'0 9 By focusing on the minimal nature of
the intrusion represented by the dog sniff, the Court implicitly recognized that
the reasonable expectation of privacy formulated in Katz is implicated to some
degree in this context." 0 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan questioned
the propriety of reaching out to decide the dog sniff issue. He felt that this
case, in which the resolution of the limits of the Terry-type investigative detention
of luggage was the major issue, was inappropriate for reaching a decision on
the distinct issue of the use of the dog. In that concurring opinion he stated:
I have expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches.
In Doe, I suggested that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a dif-
ferent case. In any event, I would leave the determination of whether dog
sniffs of luggage amount to searches, and the subsidiary question of what
standards should govern such intrusions, to a future case providing an
appropriate, and more informed, basis for deciding those questions."'
As a result of the decision in United States v. Place, ' " the Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Beale' and remanded
'"Id. at 2644-45.
"'See United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982); See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Contra, United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983).
"'See supra note 21.
"'Cf., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1330, where the court states, "Focusing on the precise physical
nature of the canine sniffing obscures, we believe, the underlying Fourth Amendment interests."
" United States v. Place, - U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2651 (1983) (citations omitted).
1121d.
'674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration of its opinion in light
of United States v. Place. 11 In its reconsideration'"5 the Ninth Circuit declined
to decide whether or not the use of the dog in this case constituted a search.
The court instead examined whether or not the use of a trained canine to sniff
luggage implicates the fourth amendment. " 6 In deciding that such activity did
indeed implicate the fourth amendment, the court held that the case "must
be remanded to the district court to permit it to determine whether the canine
investigation of Beale's luggage was supported by articulable, founded
suspicion." I 7
The court was careful to distinguish the circumstances presented in Beale
from those forming the basis for the decision in Place. In making this distinc-
tion, the court noted that the consideration concerning the Terry-type investi-
gatory detention of luggage which had influenced the outcome in Place was
entirely lacking in Beale.' .8 Circuit Judge Ely, the author on the Beale slip
opinion, then noted that since the resolution of the dog sniff issue was not
essential to the holding in Place, the language indicating that a dog sniff was
not a search' was dictum and therefore not binding.' 20
We recognize that this passage is dictum and are aware that the Supreme
Court has often remarked that its dicta are not binding .... The Place
dictum, however, is so recent and appears to have been so carefully con-
sidered that we feel obliged to apply it to the case at hand .. . .After
thoughtful study, we conclude that the Court's statement that a canine
sniff investigation "did not constitute a "search" [sic] within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment", must be read in the context of the entire
decision in Place. 12'
After declining to follow the Place dictum, the court considered the dog
"'See United States v. Beale, __ U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983).
...United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cir.
file).
"'The court stated that the issues to be resolved were:
(1) whether a police officer's use of a trained canine, with an established record of reliability, to
sniff the exterior of a traveler's luggage, located in an airport, to detect the presence of contraband,
implicates the fourth amendment; and (2) if so, to what extent the officer's use of the canine is
limited by the fourth amendment.
Id.
117d.
is In Beale I, questions concerning the existence, duration, and validity of a detention of Beale's luggage
prior to the canine sniff were not presented in the facts as stipulated by the parties. We therefore
addressed the dog sniffing question in isolation. Under Place, any detention incident to the sniff
would be permissible if it were supported by articulable, founded suspicion and if it were not
unreasonable, in length and scope.
Id.
"'See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
"'United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
"'Id. (citations omitted).
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sniff issue in isolation, and while not actually labelling the activity a search,' 22
decided that the dog sniff investigation should be subject to some degree of
judicial control. The court stated that "[tihe general consensus appears to be
that canine investigations are or ought to be subject to some limitations. In
recognizing that canine investigations implicate the Fourth Amendment, Beale
I took the stance essential to the imposition of some level of Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny over the procedure."' 3 The need for this type of limit or scrutiny
was premised on a negative answer to the question of whether or not this kind
of activity is the kind of intrusion that a free society would tolerate if that activity
were completely unrestrained.12" The court reasoned that the proper level of
restraint or limitation would be achieved by requiring that agents have a
reasonable suspicion before subjecting a traveler's luggage to a dog sniff. The
court stated that it found this requirement to be consistent with Place, 2 which
was primarily concerned with the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the
initial detention of luggage: "We instead interpret Place to conclude that no
additional suspicion is required to justify exposing luggage to a trained canine
once founded or articulable suspicion has been established."'
26
In defending its requirement that a reasonable suspicion be present before
a dog sniff is justified, the court criticized some of the other circuits' mechanical
reliance on stale arguments,' 27 and noted other cases which support such a
requirement. 28 The court also addressed and answered the argument that the
minimal nature of the intrusion removed it from the fourth amendment, stating:
The selectivity and other unintrusive aspects of canine investigations of
luggage do not exempt the process from fourth amendment scrutiny but,
""'The term 'search,' however, though conceptually convenient, is not essential to the conclusion that
investigative activity is subject to the fourth amendment .... The crucial inquiry is whether the investigative
activity is the kind of intrusion a free society is willing to tolerate if unregulated by constitutional restraints."
Id.
"'See supra notes 10 and 122.
""'We do not believe that Place should be read to validate a canine sniff in the absence of the reasonable
suspicion required for a minimally intrusive detention of luggage, whenever fortuity makes a canine sniff
feasible without any seizure of the luggage." United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
1261d.
'27"Opinions concerning the fourth amendment significance of canine investigations, rendered after Beale's
publication, have offered no new insights into the dog sniffing question and, indeed, have perpetuated
arguments that were and continue to be 'short on reasoning.' " Id.
""'Several courts have expressly noted the existence of prior suspicion in affirming the validity of the
sniff, . . .See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein; United States v. Goldstein; United States v. Sullivan;
United States v. Klein." (citations omitted.) Id. Accord, People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 345, 182
Cal. Rptr. 617, 623, 644 P.2d 810, 816 (1982), where Chief Justice Bird in her dissent notes,
While the cases do perhaps state that this particular police activity does not amount to a search,
the underlying reasoning is generally tied to the reasonableness of the activity and the existence
of specific cause to suspect the presence of contraband .... Of course, there is no Fourth Amendment
command that police activity be reasonable or justified by good cause unless it amounts to a "search."
Therefore, it requires a blind leap of faith for the majority to jump from these cases to the
conclusion that the same results would have been reached if, as in the present appeal, there were
no "particularized cause" or "reasonable suspicion" to justify the police activity.
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rather, make application of the traditional probable cause and warrant
requirements unnecessary to protect the privacy rights of those travelers
whose luggage is under investigation. The majority of courts that have
addressed the dog sniffing question have confused the relative unintru-
siveness of the investigation with its eligibility for inclusion within the scope
of the fourth amendment. The unintrusiveness of a search does not reduce,
or have any effect on, the basic expectation of privacy in the thing
searched. ' 29
The Beale court was acutely aware of the consequences of holding that
a dog sniff did not implicate fourth amendment rights. '30 By taking the stance
that it did, the court made a courageous and honest effort to respond to the
criticism of those commentators' 3 ' and courts'32 who feared the effect of com-
plete judicial abdication of responsibility in this area.' 33 The result reached in
Beale represents a conscientious attempt to achieve an acceptable balance be-
tween the severe restriction on the use of these dogs that would result from
a determination that this activity constituted a full search triggering the probable
cause and warrant requirements, and the potential for abuse that would result
from a determination that the use of dogs in no way implicated the fourth
amendment.
This attempt has not gone uncriticized.' 34 One commentator, responding
to the opinion published in Beale P35 stated:
At first glance, Beale appears to grant increased constitutional pro-
tection from police intrusions. And in the narrow area of police dog usage,
it accomplishes this purpose; it brings the use of these dogs under a system
of regulation which affords protection from unrestrained "sniff" searches.
But upon further reflection, this decision has a stronger, more detrimental
impact upon the broad constitutional guarantees of the fourth amend-
ment. It introduces another exception to the warrant clause and, perhaps
"'United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
130 The effect of holding that a canine sniff investigation requires no articulable suspicion in circumstances
in which the luggage is not detained, even briefly, in order that the investigation be performed,
would be to encourage the indiscriminate use of roving trained dogs at public airports. We decline
to reach this result.
Id.
11See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
"'In her scholarly and well-reasoned dissenting opinion in People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 345, 182
Cal. Rptr. 617, 623, 644 P.2d 810, 816 (1982), Chief Justice Bird warned,
By its judgment and reasoning in this case, a majority of this court is apparently "prepared to
leave totally uncontrolled" the government's use of trained detector dogs. I use the words
"apparently" because nowhere in its opinion is there reflected any appreciation that this is the
necessary consequence of its holding.
1""Police actions not amounting to searches or seizures may, with only imited exceptions, be as
unreasonable, arbitrary, or groundless as the officers please to make them." Id.
'4Rouse, Use of Drug-Trained Canines as a Search: Increased Protection under the Fourth Amendment
or a Further Erosion of Constitutional Guarantees?, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 163 (1983).
"'3United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
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more significantly, to the probable cause requirement. 36
The logic of this argument is difficult to discern. Since the dog sniff is
not presently deemed to constitute a full search, there is no warrant or probable
cause requirement protection in danger of being lost. Further, since the Ninth
Circuit's decision is specifically limited to the area of the canine sniff intru-
sion, enforcement officials will not be able to use it as a means of avoiding
the probable cause and warrant requirements with respect to other modes of
surveillance and intrusion. Since the canine sniff is, as the Supreme Court notes,
sui generis' there is no chance that the lesser reasonable suspicion standard
will be appliedi beyond the clearly defined limits of the canine search. Surely
it is not unreasonable to apply the Terry-type analysis - balancing legitimate
law enforcement interests against an individual's reasonable expectations of
privacy - to the sniff itself as well as to the detention of luggage.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Although the Supreme Court has held that the use of a trained canine
to sniff luggage does not of itself constitute a search, this holding was made
in conjunction with a determination of the limits of a Terry-type investigatory
detention of baggage.' 3 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the precise
issue of the dragnet use of such dogs to sniff luggage in a public place in the
absence of reasonable suspicion. Since the Court has recognized that the use
of such dogs does constitute an intrusion to some degree,' 39 it seems unlikely
that, were it to view the dragnet sniff circumstances in isolation, it would allow
the use of such dogs to be completely unrestrained.
In United States v. West,I"° a case remanded from the Supreme Court
for reconsideration in light of United States v. Place, '" the First Circuit found
that in Place, "requiring luggage to undergo a sniff test was held not to amount
to a 'search' within the fourth amendment; rather the limitations applicable
to Terry-type stops of the person were said to define the permissible scope of
an investigative detention of luggage on less than probable cause." 2 It is clear
from this language that the dog-sniff issue is not being viewed in isolation,
but as an integral aspect of the investigatory detention. As a result, the factors
which will be crucial for the disposition of detention-sniff cases under Place
will be those having an impact on the length of the detention. Recognizing this,
and the importance of the issues, 43 the First Circuit remanded to the district
'Rouse, supra note 134 at 175.
"'United States v. Place, .__ . S103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983).
"'Id. at 2644-45.
'"See supra note 106 and accompany text.
'No. 80-1127 (lst Cir. Dec. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
1,1 U.S. __, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
"'United States v. West, No. 80-1727 (1st Cir. Dec. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
""'Especially as this is the first case to be decided in this circuit after Place, we believe that the development
of a full factual record oriented toward the Place standard will assist in the development of reliable
precedent." Id.
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court for factual findings.
To enable us to resolve and weigh the matters, the parties should be per-
mitted to explore and the court should make express findings upon the
following questions: ... (2) the reasons the agents did not have the detec-
tion dog on hand, or in the immediate vicinity, when West arrived from
Florida, and any proper law enforcement purposes that those reasons
served; (3) the time within which diligent officers stationed at a major
airport like Logan can reasonably be expected to secure the presence of
a detection dog after they first determine they need one; (4) the time which
a properly conducted sniff examination will take from the moment the
dog arrives until its completion ....
In making findings, the district court may, if it wishes, admit expert
evidence on the practicalities involved in the use of detection dogs and
the investigative techniques relevant thereto (e.g., the desirability of a so-
called "building search" versus exposure of a piece of luggage directly
to a detection dog), to assist in determining the standard of speed and
dispatch to which agents should reasonably be held.'
As long as the dog-sniff issue is paired with that of the Terry-type stop
and detention, the need for any reasonable suspicion to justify the sniff itself
will remain submerged. Since each Terry investigative stop must in itself be
based upon specific, articulable facts upon which a reasonable suspicion may
be grounded, the subsequent sniff, by definition, will be justified by the same
reasonable suspicion. Given the predilection of law enforcement personnel for
optimum utilization of effective enforcement devices, it appears inevitable that
a random sniff of an array of luggage for which there is no reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that there is contraband present, will force the federal courts
to decide whether or not such suspicion is necessary to justify the sniff itself.
When this happens, one can only hope that in the interests of individual privacy
and freedom the courts will take note of and follow the undeniably sound and
honest position which the Ninth Circuit articulated in Beale.
We adhere to our position in Beale I in the belief that it presents a coherent
framework for judicial oversight of canine investigations. Rather than
follow an illogical approach of ignoring the source of the judicial authority
to establish reasonable restraints on canine investigations, we think it
infinitely more sensible to recognize that the scope of the fourth amend-
ment encompasses this investigative technique. Moreover, the restraint
adopted here is the eminently reasonable one of simply requiring that before
using a trained dog to investigate the very private contents of personal
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luggage for evidence of crime, the police have some articulable reason,
not necessarily amounting to probable cause, to suspect that the luggage
may contain contraband. 4
WILLIAM POMEROY
"'United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. File).
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